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COMMENTS
D.C. CIRCUIT ALLOWS FCC TO KILL
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: SYRACUSE PEACE
COUNCIL v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Beginning in 1927, the federal government prohibited the vast
majority of Americans from freely expressing themselves over the
public airwaves,1 and bestowed upon a lucky few the exclusive li-
' See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934). Prior to
1927, the federal government was required to issue a broadcast license to anyone who met
certain general technical requirements. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006-
1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
The federal government is given the authority to regulate broadcasting by the com-
merce clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) ("The licensing system established by Congress in the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce").
The first amendment states in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amend-
ment applies to broadcasting by limiting and directing the power of the government to regu-
late broadcasting. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 374-381 (1984).
The first statute to regulate radio communication was the Wireless Ship Act of 1910,
Pub. L, No. 262, 36 Stat. 629 (1910) (repealed 1934). This statute required that any ship
leaving an American port and capable of carrying fifty or more persons had to be equipped
with a radio and a qualified operator. Id.
The first comprehensive statute regulating broadcasting was the Radio Act of 1912,
Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (repealed 1927). This Act was passed to fulfill the
United States' obligations under the first international radio treaty. See Wireless Telegraph
Convention, Nov. 3, 1906, 37 Stat. 1565. The statute prohibited anyone from broadcasting
without a license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. See Radio Act of 1912, Pub.
L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302, 302. See generally National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 210
(discussing early history of broadcasting).
After World War I, along with the rapid advancement of radio technology, the number
of broadcasters multiplied so rapidly that the limited number of frequencies could no longer
accommodate everyone. See id. at 210-13. However, the Radio Act of 1912 did not authorize
the Secretary of Commerce to deny a license to those who met the general technical require-
ments, regardless of whether or not it would result in interference with other broadcasters.
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cense to broadcast pursuant to the newly enacted Radio Act of
1927.2 In exchange for the silence of the public at large, Congress
agreed to regulate the licensees to ensure that they broadcast in
the public interest.' In order to promote a free marketplace of
See Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. at 1006-07. In fact, the courts held that the Secretary did
not have the power to impose even restrictions as to frequency, power, and hours of opera-
tion. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926). After the
Acting Attorney General issued an opinion agreeing with these court decisions, 35 Op. Att'y
Gen. 126 (1926), the Secretary abandoned his efforts and urged stations to undertake self-
regulation. See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 212. During the ensuing seven
months until February 23, 1927, when Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927, almost 200
new stations went on the air, using any frequency and hours they desired. Id. The result was
"confusion and chaos." Id. The President, in a message to Congress, appealed for enactment
of a comprehensive radio law, claiming that "[d]ue to the decisions of the courts, the au-
thority of the department [of Commerce] under the law of 1912 has broken down." H.R.
Doc. No. 483, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1926).
For a history of broadcast law, see generally F. KAHN, DocuMENTS OF AMERICAN BROAD-
CASTING (3d ed. 1978) (compilation of broadcasting's landmark cases, statutes, reports, and
other documents). For a general history of American broadcasting, see generally, E.
BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
2 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934). This act
established the basic framework of present day broadcast law by setting up a regulatory
agency-then known as the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC")-charged with the regula-
tory standard of ensuring the "public interest, convenience, and necessity," a standard
which prevails to this day. See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 213-17.
In executing its first major task of clearing the airwaves of all broadcasters except for a
chosen few, the FRC used the following criteria to decide who would remain: "as between
two broadcasting stations with otherwise equal claims for privileges, the station which has
the longest record of continuous service has the superior right." Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32, 32 (1929), modified on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
The Radio Act of 1927 was superseded by the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)). The Communications Act of 1934, however, maintained the basic framework of the
Radio Act of 1927: (1) the regulatory standard of "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity," was incorporated into 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982); and (2) a permanent regulatory
agency, the Federal Communications Commission, took the place of the FRC. See National
Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 213-17.
In granting licenses, it is important to note that Congress stipulated that the granting
of a license would not vest any property right entitling the licensee to renewal. 47 U.S.C. §
309(h)(1).
' See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, § 9, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (1927) (repealed
1934). The Act states that "[t]he licensing authority, if public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any appli-
cant therefor a station license provided for by this Act." Id. This regulatory standard was
adopted by the superseding statute, the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. §§
307(a), 309(a) (1982). On the origin of the phrase "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity," see generally T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FIFTH ESTATE: REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 56 n.1 (1986).
For the early statements of the FRC on the meaning of the public interest standard, see
generally 2 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 166, 170 (1928) ("The emphasis must be first and foremost on
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ideas,4 the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), the
agency which Congress entrusted with the duty of ensuring the
public interest,5 imposed a two prong duty on licensees, known as
the fairness doctrine.6 The first prong required licensees "to pro-
the interest, the convenience, and the necessity of the listening public, and not on the inter-
est, convenience, or necessity of the individual broadcaster or the advertiser"); Great Lakes
Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. at 32 ("Broadcasting stations are licensed to serve the
public and not for the purpose of furthering the private or selfish interests of individuals or
groups of individuals").
The public interest standard has been interpreted as giving the public a limited right to
participate in broadcast regulation; specifically, public representatives have been recognized
as having standing to intervene in license renewal proceedings. See Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
' The general purpose of the first amendment and freedom of speech in general has
been interpreted as protecting a free exchange of ideas in which truth and falsehood are
allowed to clash in order to permit the public to identify truth. See, e.g., Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"); J. MILL, ON LIBERTY
19 (1956) (no one has a monopoly on truth, the public interest is best served by allowing all
opinions to clash in order to identify truth). See generally, Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 108-40 (1954) (synopsis of Abrams case); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-16 (1967) (explaining function of freedom of expression
in democratic society). For an interesting series of opinions, see generally ROSCOE
POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE NEWS MEDIA,
Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States 21-32
(1973) (recommendations and commentary on broadcast journalism). For a critique of the
marketplace of ideas, see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978).
1 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Federal Communications Commission was created by
the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, "[flor the purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make availa-
ble, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges.' Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982) ("The Commission, if public convenience,
interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this chapter, shall
grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter"); 47 U.S.C. §
309(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (if public interest served, commission may grant application).
Relying on the scarcity doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
granting the FCC broad regulatory power to impose public interest obligations on licensees
in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The Court ruled, first,
that Congress had delegated broad regulatory powers to the FCC which required that the
agency do more than merely act as "a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to
prevent stations from interfering with each other." Id. at 215-17. Second, the Court ruled
that the first amendment did not bar the FCC from conditioning the issuance of licenses as
the agency deemed required by the public interest. Id. at 226-27. The Court based its rea-
soning unequivocally on the scarcity doctrine: "The facilities of radio are not large enough
to accommodate all who wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from
among the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it committed the
task to the Commission." Id. at 216. See generally H. ZUCKMAN & M. GAYNES, MASS COMMU-
NICATIONS LAW Ch. IX at 317-36 (1983) (defining regulatory role of FCC).
8 The fairness doctrine was codified as an FCC regulation. Fairness Doctrine, 47 C.F.R.
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vide coverage of vitally important controversial issues."' 7 The sec-
ond prong required them "to provide a reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues."8 In
1969, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the constitutional-
ity of the fairness doctrine in the landmark decision of Red Lion v.
Federal Communications Commission.9 In 1985, however, the
§ 73.1910 (1988). It is important to note that in 1941, as a result of broadcaster abuses, the
FCC instituted the Mayflower doctrine, which essentially forbade broadcasters from editori-
alizing at all. See Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). The Commission de-
clared that "[r]adio can serve as an instrument of democracy only when devoted to the
communication of information and the exchange of ideas fairly and objectively presented."
Id. at 340. In the decision which ended the ban on editorializing, the FCC created the fair-
ness doctrine as a way to permit broadcasters to editorialize while ensuring that they were
fair to all sides. See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See gener-
ally In re Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act (1974 Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) (broad-
casters serve as trustees for public).
While the dictates of the fairness doctrine gave the broadcaster wide discretion on the
choice of who would represent the contrasting viewpoints, two other fairness doctrine sub-
requirements dictate that particular individuals implicated be given an opportunity to re-
spond. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1969). The "personal
attack" rule of the fairness doctrine requires that an individual who has been personally
assailed in a broadcast discussing issues of public concern be given an opportunity to re-
spond. See id. The "political editorial rule" requires that should a broadcaster endorse a
candidate for political office, he is then obligated to give the other candidates a reasonable
opportunity to respond. See id.
For an overview of the fairness doctrine, see generally H. NELSON & D. TEETER, JR.,
LAw OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 584-600 (1986) [hereinafter NELSON & TEETER] (discussing
general two prong duty, and personal attack and political editorial rules). Commentators
have expressed differing views of the fairness doctrine. Compare Krattenmaker & Powe,
The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985
DuKE L.J. 151 (attack on fairness doctrine) with Ferris & Kirkland, Fairness-The Broad-
caster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 605 (1985) (vigorous defense of doctrine as
being in public interest).
7 In re Rules and Regulations Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report].
8 Id. In Syracuse Peace Council, 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984), the Commission elaborated
on the factors it used to determine whether the second prong's "reasonable opportunity"
requirement had been met: "(1) the total amount of time afforded to each side, (2) the
frequency with which each side is presented, and (3) the size of the listening audience dur-
ing the various broadcasts." Id. at 1399.
9 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969). Red Lion involved two cases. Id. at 370-71. The first con-
cerned a personal attack on a writer by a television preacher. Id. at 371-73. The second case
involved a challenge by the Radio Television News Directors Association ("RTNDA") that
the personal attack and political editorial rules recently promulgated by the FCC were un-
constitutional. Id. at 370-71. The Court noted, however, that "insofar as there is an obliga-
tion of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, and insofar as that is an affirm-
ative obligation, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not differ from the
preceding fairness doctrine." Id. at 378.
In 1974, however, the Supreme Court struck down a rule which, like the fairness doc-
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FCC, under the leadership of Chairman Fowler, a zealous advocate
of deregulation,'0 released a report which strenuously criticized the
fairness doctrine.1' In a further blow to the doctrine, Judge Bork,
in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal
Communications Commission,12 ruled that the fairness doctrine
had not been codified by Congress.'" Recently, in Syracuse Peace
Council v. Federal Communications Commission,4 the United
trine, required newspapers to provide space for responses from political candidates whose
record had been criticized in the newspaper. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). For a discussion of the contradictions between Red Lion and
Tornillo, see Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Par-
tial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
10 See In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 104
F.C.C.2d 358 (1986); Commercial TV Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, (1984); Deregulation of
Television; Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 94 F.C.C.2d 678, (1983); Deregulation of Ra-
dio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13888 (1981). See generally H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra note 6, at 601-
07; Wimmer, Deregulation and the Market Failure in Minority Programming in the Socio-
economic Dimensions of Broadcast Reform, 8 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 329, (1987).
With respect to Mark Fowler, see generally The FCC Under Chairman Fowler, 10 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 405-569 (1988) (compilation of articles covering FCC under Chairman
Fowler). Mr. Fowler's leadership of the FCC has been criticized. See, e.g., Geller, The FCC
Under Mark Fowler: A Mixed Bag, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 521 (1988).
1 See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7. The 1985 Fairness Report asserted that be-
cause of changes in the communications market the fairness doctrine no longer served the
public interest. Id. at 246. The Report questioned the constitutionality of the doctrine but
did not repeal it, reasoning that such a decision should be made by Congress and the courts.
See id. at 246-47.
12 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 919 (1987).
11 Id. at 517-18. It is submitted that this ruling was incorrect insofar as it contradicted
the long standing view that Congress had adopted the fairness doctrine in its 1959 amend-
ments to the Communications Act. See Act of September 14, 1959, PUB. L. No. 86-274, § 1,
73 Stat. 557 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Research & Action Center, 806 F.2d at 1116
(Mikva, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (conclusion was "flatly wrong");
1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at 253 (Quello J., concurring) ("[Tihis record compels
the conclusion that Congress intended to codify the fairness doctrine as part of the 1959
amendments to the Communications Act. The Commission has long acquiesced in the view
that the fairness doctrine was codified by these amendments"); see also 1974 Fairness Re-
port, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 1 (1974). In addition, the Supreme Court's language in Red Lion may
indicate that the Court interpreted the 1959 Amendment as having adopted the fairness
doctrine. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380-382; see also Comment, Teletext-
Searching For the First Amendment: Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 167, 178 (1986) ("This interpretation, it is submitted, contra-
dicts the legislative history of section 315 and is irreconcilable with construction of that
provision by the Supreme Court"); Regulating Teletext: Can Traditional Broadcast Princi-
ples Justify Government Regulation After TRAC v. FCC?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1101, 1121
(1987) ("Since Red Lion it has been the opinion of the majority of courts considering the
question that the fairness doctrine was codified by the 1959 amendment to section 315(a)").
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit af-
firmed an FCC order which abrogated both prongs of the fairness
doctrine. 5
In Syracuse Peace Council, WTVH, a television station based
in Syracuse, New York, broadcast several commercials designed to
persuade the public to approve a proposed nuclear power plant. 6
The Syracuse Peace Council filed a complaint with the FCC alleg-
ing that WTVH had failed to broadcast any contrasting points of
view.17 Agreeing with the Council, the Commission found that
WTVH had violated the second prong of the fairness doctrine.' 8 In
its petition for reconsideration, the owner of WTVH, the Meredith
Corporation, argued that the fairness doctrine violated its first
amendment rights.'9 The Commission, however, refused to address
Meredith's constitutional claim.20 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the case
to the FCC with express instructions to consider the constitutional
issues.2' On remand, the Commission held that the "fairness doc-
trine contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the
public interest. 2 On appeal,23 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, affirmed the FCC's decision,
but based its decision exclusively on public policy grounds, ignor-
ing the very constitutional issues for which it had remanded the
case to the FCC.
24
Writing for the court in Syracuse Peace Council, Judge Wil-
liams reasoned that the court was bound to dispose of the case on
a non-constitutional ground if one was available. 25 The court iden-
'1 Id. at 669.
11 Id. at 656.
17 Id.
'8 Syracuse Peace Council, 99 F.C.C.2d 1389, 1401 (1984).
"' Meredith Reply to Opposition and Petition for Reconsideration and Supplement,
April 12, 1985, at 11-41, Joint Appendix in Case No. 85-1723 at 261-91.
20 Syracuse Peace Council, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 179 (Oct. 30, 1985). The Commission
asserted that the "issue should be left to Congress and the courts." Id. at 182 n.4.
21 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
22 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5057 (1987). The net effect language is
based on Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
22 Two petitioners, Geller and Lampert, petitioned the court to compel the FCC to
adopt their proposed alternatives to the abrogation of the fairness doctrine. Syracuse Peace
Council, 867 F.2d at 665. Geller and Lampert had previously urged that the FCC review a
broadcaster's compliance with the fairness doctrine only at license renewal and that the
FCC use a malice standard of review. Id.
24 Id. at 669.
2* Id. at 657 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348
1989]
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tified two of the Commission's intermediate conclusions as "core
findings," namely (1) that the application of the fairness doctrine
had a net chilling effect on the coverage of controversial issues, and
(2) that there had been dramatic increase in the number of broad-
casting outlets since the Red Lion decision which rendered the
fairness doctrine no longer "narrowly tailored to meet a substantial
government interest."28 The court noted the FCC's express asser-
tions that the policy and constitutional issues in the case were "in-
extricably intertwined," and that "its policy conclusion was a mere
consequence of its constitutional one. '2  Notwithstanding these
statements, Judge Williams asserted that, based on its intermedi-
ate conclusions which could have been labeled policy judgements,
the FCC could have based its order solely on policy grounds. 8
Concluding that the court was justified in reviewing the FCC deci-
sion as if the Commission had based its decision exclusively on pol-
icy grounds,29 Judge Williams applied an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review and affirmed the FCC's termination of both
prongs of the fairness doctrine without reaching the constitutional
issues.30 In a separate opinion, Chief Judge Wald dissented from
the court's affirmation of the repeal of the first prong of the fair-
ness doctrine.3 1 She stated that the FCC's decision was the "very
model of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking," and character-
ized it as "deregulation running riot. '3 2
In another separate opinion, Judge Starr emphatically dis-
agreed with the majority's refusal to address the first amendment
issues-characterizing such refusal as doing "violence to the basic
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
" See id. at 657, 660-661.
27 Id. at 658.
28 See id. at 658-661.
29 Id. at 658-661. The court reasoned that it could have compelled the FCC to base its
decision solely on non-constitutional grounds. See id. at 659. But see id. at 677 (Starr, J.,
concurring) (asserting court could not compel FCC to base decision on non-constitutional
grounds).
20 Id. at 669.
31 Id. at 673 (Wald, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32 Id. (Wald, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Chief Judge con-
cluded, first, that the FCC had failed to provide adequate notice, as required by the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, that the first prong of the fairness doctrine was under review. Id. at
669 (Wald, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Second, she asserted that the
FCC's failure to allege that continued enforcement of the first prong would adversely affect
the public violated the Supreme Court's Red Lion decision, which asserted that the right of
the public is paramount to the right of broadcasters. See id. at 670-73 (Wald, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 63:556
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framework of the modern administrative state. '3 3 Judge Starr as-
serted that the principle relied on by the majority to avoid consti-
tutional analysis permitted reliance on non-constitutional grounds
only where "the agency in fact based its decision, either exclusively
or alternatively, on such grounds." 4 Judge Starr maintained that
there was no independent non-constitutional rationale in the
FCC's decision, especially since the FCC had sought to modify or
overrule the Supreme Court's Red Lion decision.35 Judge Starr rea-
soned, however, that the only first amendment rights implicated
were those of the broadcasters.36 Consequently, he concluded that
an arbitrary and capricious standard of review was sufficient to
judge the validity of the FCC's determinations.37
It is submitted that by upholding the FCC's decision to abro-
gate the fairness doctrine without reviewing the FCC's first amend-
ment analysis, the Syracuse Peace Council court ignored the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the first amendment. It is asserted
that the majority was required to review the FCC's self-styled first
amendment reasoning which contravened Supreme Court prece-
dents. This Comment will first examine the Supreme Court's ap-
plication of the first amendment to broadcasting. Second, it will
review the constitutional nature of the Commission's intermediate
conclusions. Finally, this Comment will assert that the FCC's ab-
rupt switch to complete reliance on an advertiser based market
mechanism violates the first amendment.
33 Id. at 676-677 (Starr, J., concurring) ("Where, as here, the agency's policy judgment
is wholly driven by its constitutional reasoning and conclusions, the reviewing court is
obliged to analyse the case in those terms").
11 Id. at 674 (Starr, J., concurring) (based on Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1935)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942)). Judge Starr em-
phasized that, though it should endeavor to avoid unnecessary constitutional determina-
tions, a reviewing court is explicitly forbidden from upholding an agency's action by supply-
ing grounds that the agency would have found and from compelling an agency on remand
"to make a separate and independent public interest determination." Id. at 678.
11 See id. at 676-79 (Starr, J., concurring). With respect to Red Lion, Judge Starr
asserted:
[T]he Commission decided, in light of the Meredith remand, to tangle with Red
Lion itself. There is no escaping this hard, cold fact: in the wake of the generously
worded Meredith remand, the Commission has rendered a Red Lion decision ....
...Meredith has unleashed Red Lion, and it will not do to pretend, with
cheery bravado, that Red Lion is still secure in its pre-Meredith cage. Red Lion is
now out on the streets, released by a deliberate and careful FCC decision.
Id. at 675-76 (Starr, J., concurring).
31 See id. at 679-80 (Starr, J., concurring).
3 See id. at 679-88 (Starr, J., concurring).
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN BROADCASTING
The Supreme Court has determined that the primary function
of the first amendment in broadcasting is to protect the rights of
the public.3 8 In Red Lion, the Court maintained that, with respect
to the first amendment, "[ilt is the right of the viewers and listen-
ers, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."39 The
Court emphasized that "[i]t is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial here. '40 As a result, the Court
held that the first amendment is not violated by a policy of
mandatory public access to private broadcast frequencies. 41 The
Court's rationale was based on the fact that the broadcasting sys-
tem which Congress created in 1927 requires the government to
prohibit virtually all citizens from using the publicly owned air-
waves in order to give "frequency monopolies" to government li-
censed broadcasters. 42
For decades the fairness doctrine has been the FCC's primary
means of protecting the public's first amendment right to receive
varying points of view on controversial topics. 43 Consequently, it is
asserted that the Syracuse Peace Council court should have ad-
"8 See Red Lion 395 U.S. at 390 (1969) ("the people as a whole retain their interest in
free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment"); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (primary concern of broadcast regulation "has generally been to
secure the public's First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of
views").
" Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
40 Id. As the Court reiterated, "[t]hat right may not constitutionally be abridged either
by Congress or by the FCC." Id.
" See id. at 389. The Court asserted that its consistent view has been that "[wihere
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id. at 388; see National Broad-
casting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
"' See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 ("Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should
be expressed on this unique medium").
43 See 1974 Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 [hereinafter 1974 Fairness Report]. In its
1974 report, the FCC described the fairness doctrine "as the single most important require-
ment of operation in the public interest-the 'sine qua non' for grant of renewal of license."
Id. at 10 (quoting Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d
283, 292 (1970)); see also Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 677 (Starr, J., concurring)
("The FCC has never wavered from justifying the fairness doctrine, instrumentally, by ref-
erence to the fostering of First Amendment values. This view, moreover, has been repeat-
edly endorsed by the Supreme Court" (citations omitted)).
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dressed whether repeal of the doctrine violated the public's first
amendment rights-even if the FCC had justified its decision
solely on policy grounds.
C
THE FCC's FACT FINDINGS WERE DE FACTO CONSTITUTIONAL
RULINGS
The FCC itself claimed that its intermediate conclusions were
not administrative "fact findings" but self-styled judgments on
how the first amendment should be applied to broadcasting. 44 In
fact, it is suggested that the Syracuse Peace Council court simply
turned a blind eye to the Commission's brazen proclamation that
"[t]he special broadcast standard applied by the [Supreme] Court
in Red Lion, which sanctions restrictions on speakers in order to
promote the interest of viewers and listeners, contradicts" the first
amendment.45
A. Only the Supreme Court May Overrule Its Net Effect
Judgment
With respect to the FCC's first finding that the net effect of
4 See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5046. The Commission itself made it
perfectly clear that it was unable to dispose of the case solely through policy judgments. The
Commission noted: "it became evident to us that the policy and constitutional considera-
tions in this matter are inextricably intertwined and that it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to isolate the policy considerations from the constitutional aspects underlying the doc-
trine." Id. Judge Starr observed that the FCC was justified in analyzing the decision
"through First Amendment lenses," given the fairness doctrine's "constitutionally-charged
history." Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 677 (Starr, J., concurring). He noted that
even the majority rationalized the FCC's judgment in constitutional terms. Id. at 679 (Starr,
J., concurring). After a painstaking analysis, Judge Starr concluded: "With all respect, the
court can find only constitutional reasoning within the [FCC] Order and can support the
Order only by relying upon constitutional reasoning." Id. (Starr, J., concurring).
15 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5057. The FCC engaged in a fierce criticism of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment in Red Lion. See id. at 5048-58.
The Commission promulgated its own standard: "we believe that under the First Amend-
ment, the right of viewers and listeners to receive diverse viewpoints is achieved by guaran-
teeing them the right to receive speech unencumbered by government intervention." Id. at
5057. The Commission observed: "The Red Lion decision, however, apparently views the
notion that broadcasters should come within the free press and free speech protections of
the First Amendment as antagonistic to the interest of the public in obtaining access to the
marketplace of ideas." Id. Consequently, it declared: "As a result, it is squarely at odds with
the general philosophy underlying the First Amendment." Id. It is asserted that an adminis-
trative agency's blatant disregard of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution
is violative of a constitutional framework in which the Supreme Court is the "final arbiter"
of the Constitution. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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the fairness doctrine is to reduce controversial speech, the Syra-
cuse Peace Council court recognized that the FCC's conclusion was
not based on a statistically valid study, but rested, by and large, on
the anecdotal accounts of a few broadcasters.46 In fact, Judge Wil-
liams asserted that the effect of the fairness doctrine on the vol-
ume of controversial speech simply is not amenable to empirical
fact finding.47 Nonetheless, the majority approved of the FCC's
"normative value judgment"-that the doctrine's deterrent effect
on expression outweighed its power to generate speech-on the
ground that it was similar to the Supreme Court's first amendment
rationale concerning the print media.48 The FCC judgment, how-
ever, directly contravened the Supreme Court's own net effect
value judgment concerning the broadcast media in Red Lion.49
"I See Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 664 (majority noted validity of the United
Church of Christ's criticism that "the NAB study. . . was 'not based on a statistically valid
sample of broadcasters' experiences, but rather, was merely a series of anecdotal
accounts' ").
One eminent commentator has emphasized the weakness of the Commission's evidence.
See Hyde, FCC Action Repealing the Fairness Doctrine: A Revolution in Broadcast Regu-
lation, 38 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1175, 1185-86 (1987). Rosel H. Hyde, a former Chairman of the
FCC, pointed out that:
The Commission record, while replete with opinions, offers no basis upon
which a sound judgment could be made as to the effect of the fairness doctrine.
Specifically, whether the doctrine increased or decreased the coverage of contro-
versial issues of public importance remains unknown. However, the Commission
found that the comments received were sufficient to make a generalized finding
that the fairness doctrine inhibits broadcasters, with no basis on which to hold
that the views submitted were representative of the industry, and with no consid-
eration given to the fact that the finding made was inconsistent with findings
made previously by the FCC and by Congressional committees that were based on
much broader investigations.
Id.; see also Conrad, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Blow for Citizen Access, 41
FED. COM. L.J. 161, 189 ("Congressional committees have explicitly rejected this [net effect]
argument in the past finding no conclusive evidence to support such assertion. Additionally,
both the Supreme Court in Red Lion and the FCC itself in its 1974 Fairness Report found
that the Fairness Doctrine does not have an overall chilling effect on speech").
47 Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 664-65. "Editorial decisions are obviously
driven by many factors. Isolation of causes in any scientific way seems virtually impossible."
Id. at 664. A finding of the net effect of the fairness doctrine theoretically would involve
weighing how much controversial speech would be broadcast as a result of enforcing the
fairness doctrine against the amount of controversial speech that would be chilled. Id. at
664-65. The court noted that it could not understand how "anyone could be sure either
way." Id. at 665.
8 Id. at 665. ("The policy judgment seems to us . . . quite similar to the Supreme
Court's finding of similar value judgments implicit in the First Amendment as applied to
the print media").
" See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393 (fairness doctrine has not reduced coverage of contro-
versial issues).
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Moreover, although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the pos-
sibility of reversing its net effect judgment of the fairness doctrine,
the Court, it is urged, has reserved for itself-not the FCC-the
right to reconsider "the constitutional basis" of its own decision.50
B. Numerical Scarcity Is a "Straw Man's Argument"
With respect to the FCC's second "finding," namely that in-
creases in the total number of broadcasting outlets have rendered
the fairness doctrine unconstitutional in that it was no longer "nar-
rowly tailored to meet a substantial government interest," it is sug-
gested that the Syracuse Peace Council court failed to recognize
that the Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine because it
was "tailored" to remedy allocational scarcity, not numerical scar-
city. Allocational scarcity concerns the first amendment problems
that are created by the very limited number of government licenses
available relative to the actual number of citizens who wish to ac-
cess the public airwaves. 5 1 Numerical scarcity, on the other hand,
refers to the notion that there may not be enough broadcasting
outlets to ensure a diversity of viewpoints."2 The FCC's finding
that there has been an increase in the total number of broadcast
stations relates to numerical scarcity.53 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, upheld the fairness doctrine in Red Lion on the expressed
ground that the doctrine alleviated allocational scarcity.5 4 More-
50 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 379 n. 12 (1984) ("As we recog-
nized in Red Lion, however, were it to be shown by the Commission that the fairness doc-
trine '[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing' speech, we would then be
forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision in that case.") (emphasis
supplied).
Moreover, it is suggested that the Syracuse Peace Council court's recognition that the
primary basis for the FCC's "value judgment" involved a first amendment analysis man-
dated, at minimum, that the court review the FCC's first amendment reasoning.
Finally, with respect to the net effect finding, it is suggested that the majority failed to
recognize the Supreme Court's admonition that it might be necessary for the FCC to enforce
the first prong of the fairness doctrine in order for the net effect of the doctrine to remain
positive. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393 ("if present licensees should suddenly prove timor-
ous, the Commission is not powerless to insist that they give adequate and fair attention to
public issues").
" Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043, 5054-55 (1987); see Syracuse Peace Coun-
cil, 867 F.2d at 682-83 (Starr, J., concurring).
52 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5053-54.
53 Id.
See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400. The Court held:
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allo-
cating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without gov-
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over, in 1984, the Supreme Court explained in Federal Communi-
cations Commission v. League of Woman Voters of California "
that the fairness doctrine was a prime example of a regulatory doc-
trine which was narrowly tailored to promote an important govern-
mental interest.56
eminent assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their
views, we hold the regulations and rulings at issue here are both authorized by
statute and constitutional.
Id. In fact, the Court was so concerned with the evil of allocational scarcity that it asserted
that even if allocational scarcity should become a thing of the past, something not even the
FCC has claimed, the government would still be justified in enacting public interest regula-
tions because of the past advantages of licensees while allocational scarcity existed. See id.
at 399-400.
It is submitted that Judge Starr was incorrect in his assertion that the Supreme Court
had partially justified the fairness doctrine on numerical scarcity. See Syracuse Peace
Council, 867 F.2d at 683 (Starr, J., concurring). As the former FCC Chairman Hyde has
pointed out:
Neither the fairness doctrine nor the Red Lion decision made any claim that the
doctrine was necessary, or that it was justified by reason of a shortage in broadcast
frequencies or broadcast outlets. The Red Lion opinion does not include a refer-
ence as to the number of broadcast stations, or even a suggestion that the fairness
doctrine was necessary to provide an assurance that sufficient diversity of opinion
on controversial issues of public importance would be provided. Hence, the Com-
mission's observations that there has been a 54 percent increase in the number of
radio stations and a 57 percent increase since the Red Lion decision ... are not
responsive or relevant to any argument set forth in the fairness doctrine or the
Red Lion decision.
Hyde, supra note 46, at 1179.
Of course, the FCC was aware of the Supreme Court's scarcity rationale but chose to
replace it with its own anti-scarcity reasoning. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at
5054 ("We do not believe that any scarcity rationale justifies differential First Amendment
treatment of the print and broadcast media"). In fact this was not the first time that the
pro-deregulation FCC had attempted to overrule the Court's scarcity doctrine. For example,
in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987), Judge Bork admonished the Commission for at-
tempting to replace the scarcity doctrine:
Perhaps the Supreme Court will one day revisit this area of the law and either
eliminate the distinction between print and broadcast media ... or announce a
constitutional distinction that is more usable than the present one. In the
meantime, neither we nor the Commission are free to seek new rationales to rem-
edy the inadequacy of the doctrine in this area. The attempt to do that has led
the Commission to find "implicit" considerations in the law that are not really
there. The Supreme Court has drawn a first amendment distinction between
broadcast and print media on a premise of the physical scarcity of broadcast
frequencies.
Id. at 509.
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
56 See id. at 378-80. The Court noted that it had upheld the fairness doctrine "because
the doctrine advanced the substantial governmental interest in ensuring balanced presenta-
tions of views in this limited medium and yet posed no threat that a 'broadcaster [would be
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A MONOPOLIZED BROADCAST MARKET AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Finally, it is suggested that the FCC's abrupt switch to total
reliance on an unrestricted market, controlled by broadcasters and
advertisers violates the notion that "[iut is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee. ' 57 For example, citizens do not have a
right even to purchase airtime in order to exercise their paramount
first amendment rights, 58 while licensees, with inferior first amend-
ment rights, can now make round-the-clock use of the public air-
waves for their own purposes, free of charge. In addition, the
denied permission] to carry a particular program."' Id. Furthermore, in articulating the
standard the court again referred to the doctrine as follows: "these restrictions have been
upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of pub-
lic issues." Id. at 380. It is suggested that these statements by the Supreme Court are all the
more relevant because they were made in 1984, fifteen years after Red Lion, and hence tend
to undercut the FCC's contention that vast changes since 1969 have rendered the fairness
doctrine unconstitutional.
11 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. In considering the granting of absolute rights to licen-
sees over the use of their assigned frequencies, the Court determined that "the First
Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their'
frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Gov-
ernment has denied others the right to use." Id. at 391.
It is submitted that the Syracuse Peace Council court ignored the fact that the FCC
failed to provide the requisite reasoned basis for a new policy since the Commission did not
produce any evidence demonstrating how an advertiser based market mechanism would pro-
tect the public's first amendment right to express controversial ideas. Justice Brennan, for
example, has pointed out that because "of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing
their audience, . . . in the commercial world of mass communication, it is simply 'bad busi-
ness' to espouse-or even to allow others to espouse-the heterodox or the controversial."
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 750
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating FCC's termination of its commercialization guidelines for chil-
dren's programming becasuse such deregulation policy had no "reasoned basis").
" See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 130-
32 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall argued that "retention of such absolute control in the hands of a few government
licensees is inimical to the First Amendment, for vigorous, free debate can be attained only
when members of the public have at least some opportunity to take the initiative and edito-
rial control into their own hands." Id. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is important to
note that the Court has not found that broadcasting is government action, which could re-
quire that broadcasters give a right of access to the general public. See generally T. CARTER,
M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE: REGULATION OF
ELECTRONICS MASS MEDIA 78-81 (1986) (discussing issue of whether broadcasting is govern-
ment action).
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FCC's recent wholesale deregulatory policies have eliminated
mainstay regulations designed to ensure the diversity and integrity
of the market itself.59 Consequently, it is asserted that without the
fairness doctrine, viewpoints that are neither commercially profita-
ble for advertisers nor strongly held by licensees will be barred
from the airwaves.60
CONCLUSION
In affirming the FCC decision to abrogate both prongs of the
fairness doctrine, the District of Columbia Circuit ignored the par-
amount first amendment rights of the American public, the prop-
erty owners of the airwaves. In order to avoid facing the first
amendment, the Syracuse Peace Council court twisted the FCC's
self-proclaimed constitutional judgments into policy judgments. By
doing so, the court has approved a regulatory climate conducive to
monopolization of the public airwaves by licensees.
Roger S. Antao
'9 See Unified Agenda, 49 Fed. Reg. 16,600 (1984). In its deregulatory policies the
Fowler Commission did not stop at the "underbrush of regulation" but eliminated many
ownership rules regulating the structure of the market, such as: (1) rules limiting regional
concentration of ownership; (2) cross-ownership rules; and (3) multiple ownership rules. See
id.; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
60 It is suggested that creating an inhibiting threshold based on the profitability of
speech contradicts the core values of the first amendment, which places a premium on con-
troversial political speech and provides only limited protection for commercial speech. See
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
For proposed alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine, see Labunski, May it Rest in Peace:
Public Interest and Public Access in the Post-Fairness Doctrine Era, 11 HASTINGS COMM/
ENT L.J. 219 (1989); Hilen, Alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine: Structural Limits Should
Replace Content Controls, 11 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 291 (1989).
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